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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a classification of the emerging agrarian class positions in 
China today. Using an instrument based on rural households’ combination of 
market positions in four markets – land, labour, means of production and product – 
I identify five agrarian classes: the capitalist employer class, the petty-bourgeois 
class of commercial farmers, two labouring classes of dual-employment households 
and wage workers, and subsistence peasants. This classification is then used as a 
heuristic device to organize the empirical analysis that examines how dynamics of 
agrarian change drive class differentiation in rural China. For the capitalist 
employer class, the analysis focuses on their diverse paths of accumulation; for the 
petty-bourgeois commercial farmers, their contingent resilience and tendencies of 
differentiation; and for the two classes of labour, the commodification of their 
subsistence. The state plays important but varying roles in all these processes. 
Key words: class differentiation, accumulation, commodification, state intervention, 
capitalism, China 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to conceptually develop a classification of the emerging agrarian 
class positions in China today through analysing the central dynamics of agrarian change that 
drive class differentiation – namely, accumulation of capital, commodification of subsistence, 
and the state’s intervention in these two processes. Such a classification scheme, as a 
heuristic device, will be helpful in advancing the scholarship on China’s agrarian change in at 
least three ways. First, the effort in formulating this classification will provide a summary 
account of the diverse dynamics of agrarian change and helps to identify key patterns of 
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accumulation and commodification that have emerged in the Chinese countryside. Second, 
such a classification demonstrates the effects of agrarian change on social differentiation, 
challenges the conventional view of an undifferentiated farming population, and provides a 
conceptual basis for bringing class analysis back into stratification research on rural China. 
Finally, any analysis of rural politics, social mobilization and social conflicts, which now all 
take place on this differentiated social terrain, will also benefit from such a mapping of class 
positions and preliminary analysis of their class interests and class relations.  
Sociological research on the changing social structure in contemporary China in the 
past three decades has primarily focused on the impact of the economic transition on patterns 
of social inequalities and processes of social mobility. So (2003, 364) pointed out more than 
ten years ago that ‘there is little effort to analyze the present Chinese society from a class 
analysis viewpoint.’ This lacuna is particularly glaring in the studies of rural China. While 
scholars have noticed the differentiation of the once homogeneous rural society caused by 
waves of profound changes, no study has yet systematically examined the processes and 
outcomes of class differentiation in rural China and how these processes are driven by 
dynamics of agrarian change. So (2003), for example, in one of the rare exceptions that 
attempts a class analysis of stratification in China, points out the increasing class 
differentiation and conflicts in both rural and urban China, but offers no detailed analysis of 
rural class differentiation. 
The existing literature on rural differentiation in China mostly approaches this issue 
from a sociological perspective that sees differentiation as distributional inequalities along 
some gradational scale of privilege or deprivation, be it income, education, power, or wealth. 
It focuses on two topics: the relative importance of entrepreneurship vis-a-vis political power 
in forming rural elites, and the growing importance of wage income in creating inequalities 
among the non-elite population. On the first issue, most works do not see entrepreneurship or 
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office-holding as class positions in the emerging social relations of production, but rather as 
changing patterns of incentives, opportunities, and rewards for individual characteristics 
created by new economic institutions (Nee 1996; Walder and Zhao 2006). On the rising 
importance of wage income in rural livelihoods, the literature focuses on how differential 
human capital endowments and ensuing different participation in wage jobs have created 
rising income inequalities (Khan and Riskin 1998; Parish et al. 1995; Walder 2002). The 
impact of such inequalities on stratification is seen as creating a gradational distribution of 
rural households in terms of household income. 
Class – especially in the materialist sense as distinct positions in social relations of 
production and reproduction (Bernstein 1979, 430) – is entirely missing in all these 
quantitative, gradational analyses of inequality and stratification in rural China. What they 
fail to see is that, rather than just generating varying levels of incomes, entrepreneurial 
activities, wage employment, and family-based farming – in various forms and combinations 
– are forming new social relations of production, which differentiate the rural population into 
new structural positions in the rural economy – classes that have qualitatively different lived 
experiences and economic interests from each other and complex inter-relationships.   
The burgeoning literature on agrarian change in contemporary China makes clear the 
relevance, and indeed necessity, of studying the class dynamics and outcomes of agrarian 
change. As the spread of capitalist forms of production in Chinese agriculture has accelerated 
in the past decade (Huang 2011; Huang et al. 2012; Zhang and Donaldson 2008), new 
relations of production and new types of producers have emerged (Zhang and Donaldson 
2010). These works, focusing on how agricultural modernization gives rise to new types of 
producers, however, fall short in examining the full scope of dynamics of agrarian change 
that drive class differentiation and the effects of class differentiation on rural social structure. 
This study intends to fill that gap.  
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The complex dynamics that drive class differentiation are unleashed by broader 
processes of agrarian change that also include rural industrialization and rural-to-urban 
migration. The rise of capitalist forms of agriculture is only the most recent impetus added to 
this on-going process of agrarian transition. Capital accumulation in non-farm businesses and 
wage work by the rural population are tightly connected to the processes of accumulation and 
commodification in agriculture and central to rural class differentiation. Thus, an analysis of 
the dynamics of class differentiation and formation of new agrarian classes, which this study 
contributes to, needs to go beyond agricultural producers and look at how capitalist 
accumulation, wage work, and petty commodity production on both sides of the rural-urban 
and agricultural-industrial divisions are differentially combined within rural households.  
In the following, I first develop an instrument that uses rural households’ combination 
of market positions to empirically identify their class positions in social relations of 
production. Using this instrument to analyse qualitative case data collected from fieldwork 
and a literature review, I produce a classification scheme that comprises five agrarian classes: 
the capitalist employer class, the petty-bourgeois class of commercial farmers, two labouring 
classes of dual-employment households and wage workers, and a residual category of 
subsistence peasants. In the empirical analysis that ensues, for the capitalist employer class, I 
focus on the diverse dynamics of accumulation; for the petty bourgeoisie, on their tendencies 
of differentiation; and for the two classes of labour, on the commodification of their 
subsistence.  
 
ANALYSING CLASS DIFFERENTIATION IN AGRARIAN CHANGE 
The materialist theoretical perspective sees class differentiation in agrarian change as 
the result of the spread of capitalism into the countryside, which creates new social relations 
of production and new structural positions situated in such relations. There are different 
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views about what constitutes capitalism and how to observe the spread of capitalism in 
agriculture. This study follows a widely adopted view that sees the spread of capitalism as 
comprising two inter-related processes: the extension and intensification of commodity 
relations, especially with regard to labour and land, which involves changes in social-
property relations; and, the subsumption of traditional producers in the circuit of capital, 
where they become market dependent and are subjected to the imperatives of market 
competition and improving productivity through developing the productive forces (Bernstein 
2010; Brenner 1976; Wood 2002).  
Contrary to some misinterpretations of the classical works of Lenin and Kautsky, this 
theoretical perspective does not proffer a pre-determined model of capitalist development and 
class differentiation in rural areas. Instead, the concrete processes of differentiation are 
understood as always shaped by the specific ways through which the two processes of 
capitalist development unfold. While all capitalist relations of production share common 
features, local political-economic conditions and socio-historical background create 
specificities in how commodity relations grow, how producers confront markets, and, as a 
result, the types of class positions and relations that emerge.  
Within this broad theoretical perspective, to adapt to local specificities, researchers of 
class differentiation in various contexts have devised different analytical strategies and 
empirical instruments. Conceptually, most scholars focus on how the two processes of 
capitalist development create new class categories. In constructing the empirical instruments, 
most agree that the use of a single measure such as farm size is both theoretically flawed and 
empirically misleading (Oya 2004). Scholars therefore select different combinations of 
criteria, based on the availability of data and local specificities, to identify class positions.  
In one of the most concentrated treatments of this topic, in the ‘India debate’, Patnaik 
(1976) proposed a labour exploitation index that focuses on how commodity relations 
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involving labour and land differentiate the rural population. The E ratio is defined as the ratio 
between a producer’s net use of outside labour (including direct hiring of labour and indirect 
appropriation of labour through rent) and family labour days. In a later study (Patnaik 1988, 
309), she further found that the labour exploitation index strongly correlates with differences 
across households in their patterns of market integration and competition, including level of 
capitalization in production, productivity, and proportion of marketed output. Among other 
contributions to the India debate, Bardhan (1982) develops an instrument highly similar to 
Patnaik’s labour exploitation index that measures households’ labour allocation across self-
employment, wage work and labour hiring, but excluding land rental activities; Bharadwaj 
(1985) focuses instead on access to land and degree of integration into markets. In the Africa 
literature, Sender and Smith (1990) used a combination of purchased cultivated land, 
education, and a proxy for the labour exploitation index to identify differentiation among a 
sample of large farmers. In a study of a sample of large- and mid-scale farmers in Senegal, 
Oya (2004) combined an even wider set of criteria, including patterns of labour-use, land use, 
and surplus use, degree of capitalisation, and education. In the Latin American context, Deere 
and de Janvry (Deere 1990; Deere and de Janvry 1979) proposed a conceptual framework 
that focuses on the precise forms of surplus appropriation and used those to identify class 
positions. Their interest, however, is mainly in rural households’ participation in multiple 
class relations and how that shapes the reproduction of households, rather than in the 
outcomes of differentiation.  
In the Chinese context, the most famous attempt to identify agrarian classes is 
probably Mao’s essay in 1933, where he applied Lenin’s framework, which focuses on 
surplus appropriation through labour hiring and land rental, and identified five major classes 
in rural China (Mao 1991 [1933]). Rural China today is of course drastically different from 
the time when Mao was leading the struggling Communist Party in conducting land reforms 
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in the base areas of Jiangxi and Fujian. For a start, rural areas in southern China during Mao’s 
time were dominated by a non-productive landlord class, and most land rentals were in the 
form of landlords’ and rich peasants’ rental to tenant farmers, rather than land leasing by 
capitalist farmers from smallholders, as is the case today. 
 What emerges from this summary is that, despite the obvious differences in all these 
instruments of class identification (in terms of dichotomous vs. continuous measures and 
relative importance given to specific criteria), a common set of practices has been identified 
as indicators of the rise of capitalist relations of productions and can, therefore, be measured 
and used in combination to identify emerging class positions. These include land leasing and 
purchasing, labour hiring or selling, marketing of outputs, and capital investment in means of 
production (i.e., capitalization). These activities are exactly what our theoretical 
understanding of the spread of capitalism as intensification of commodity relations and 
penetration of market imperatives would suggest takes place during agrarian change: access 
to land and labour now is realized through commodity relations, and market competition in 
sales of outputs drives capitalization in production to raise productivity.  
 
Identifying Class Positions by Market Situations: An Analytical Approach 
In this study, I adopt the same analytical focus on these four activities. But, in 
constructing an empirical instrument for classification, I measure these activities with 
qualitatively defined positions on four markets: leasing land (in or out) on land rental markets, 
hiring or selling labour on labour market, selling outputs on product markets, and finally, 
purchasing modern means of production on input markets. Rural households’ combinations 
of positions in these four markets then form the basis of identifying their class positions. 
Class positions, understood here as distinct positions in social relations of production and 
reproduction, are determined by both property relations and market participation. While these 
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two dimensions are conceptually not reducible to each other, in the empirical cases I study 
here, differences in property relations always manifest in different types of market 
participation. The combination of market situations in a household therefore serves as a good 
instrument for empirically identifying class positions.  
Using qualitative measures, compared to quantitative scales like the labour 
exploitation index, has its disadvantages. Qualitatively defined market positions only give us 
crude measures of households’ participation in markets, while unable to identify differences 
in degree. I am limited to this choice here by the lack of statistical data, to which quantitative 
scales can be applied. But more importantly, defining class positions based on combinations 
of qualitatively defined market positions has important advantages that justify its use.  
As suggested earlier, the key difference between the materialist conceptualization of 
social class and rural differentiation and the sociological, gradational alternative is that the 
former defines classes as qualitatively distinctive positions situated in social relations of 
production, while the latter sees classes as gradationally unequal positions along some 
quantitative distributions. Thus, to avoid slipping into a gradational analysis and producing a 
large – or even infinite number – of classes, in the end some judgement has to be made by the 
researcher to find cut-off points along the quantitative scale in order to identify a small 
number of qualitatively different class categories. In Patnaik’s use of the labour exploitation 
index, for example, the line separating middle peasants from poor peasants is drawn in the 
following way: while they both sell labour, the latter sell more than their use of family labour 
but the former sell less (Patnaik 1976, A-85). One can therefore think of these scales as 
expressing qualitative differences in quantitative terms. 
Furthermore, when quantitative scales are used to identify class positions, too much 
flexibility and fluidity can be created in the classification scheme, in the sense that 
households seem to be able to move relatively easily along a continuum of class 
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differentiation by, for example, leasing in more land, selling less labour, investing more in 
means of production while cutting down on consumption, and selling more products on 
markets – which can all lead to changes in the quantitative scale. This leaves the impression 
that whatever ‘classes’ identified along this continuum are only ‘tendencies’ (Oya 2004, 314), 
rather than well-formed structural positions. This can be a sensible approach in the particular 
context under study.  
In contrast, a classification based on qualitative identification of combination of 
market situations highlights the structural aspect of rural class differentiation. For China’s 
case, I contend that agrarian change over the past three decades has progressed to the extent 
that relatively stable structural positions can be identified in the new social relations of 
production, now mediated mainly through commodity relations in market. Seeing class 
positions as based on combination of market situations, therefore, gives us a dialectical 
perspective in understanding class formation in agrarian change. On one hand, class positions 
are fluid, as both their incumbents’ ‘endowments’ can change and the market structure and 
institutions that condition people’s opportunities and experiences in markets can also change 
as a result of class struggles and state intervention. On the other, class positions can also 
become stable and ‘structured’, when stable institutional arrangements and distribution of 
economic resources and political power create patterned interactions on markets and ‘lock’ 
people into certain market situations. For example, unless there is a land redistribution or 
total revamp of state welfare programs, property-less rural residents are locked into a specific 
situation in the labour market: selling their labour power and hence subject to exploitation. 
Once class positions are identified on the basis of market situations, as a heuristic 
device, such a classification that focuses on market situations can then direct our analytical 
attention to the dynamics that drive class differentiation through creating unequal market 
conditions and expanding market relations unevenly. For example, in order to understand the 
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market situation that proletarianized wage workers are in, we must examine the use of extra-
economic means in primitive accumulation that creates the conditions for capital’s 
exploitation of ‘free’ labour. The combination of market situations is used here both as an 
empirically observable proxy of class positions and manifestation of underlying class 
dynamics. 
My analytical strategy in this study is therefore two-fold. First, to study the outcomes 
of class differentiation, I use households’ combinations of market situations to classify them 
into class positions. And then, to analyse the dynamics that drive class differentiation, I treat 
markets as contested arenas of class relations and state intervention and examine how 
conditions of market exchange are created, commodity relations are expanded and resisted, 
and people are either constrained or enabled by their market positions.  
In this study, I use the household as the unit of analysis. In the rural context, property, 
which is held by households, has always been more important than occupations, which 
individuals take, in determining class positions. At least in rural China’s context, individuals’ 
occupation in wage employment is closely bonded with property-based, petty commodity 
production of their households through a household division of labour. Therefore, instead of 
determining one’s class position, an individual’s occupation is in fact the result of a 
household allocation of labour, determined by the household’s control over property – more 
specifically, whether the household has enough land and means of production to fully employ 
its labour under the prevailing technical conditions of production and generate returns 
comparable to wage work. 
There are, however, two caveats when we use households as the unit of analysis. First, 
conceptually, a ‘household’ should be a unit of coordinated livelihood strategies and resource 
sharing without co-residence necessarily; but empirically, most observations are based on 
units of co-residence. In rural China’s case, small family size, absence of polygamy, and the 
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family division practice (parents maintain co-residence with the eldest adult son, while other 
adult children, if any, form separate households) make the discrepancy between these two 
ways of identifying households minimal.2 Second, property control in households is often 
unevenly distributed and surplus appropriation also takes place within households, both of 
which create intra-household differentiation between sexes and generations.3 Using 
households as the unit of analysis precludes us from investigating how members in the same 
households may occupy different class positions. Exposing this secondary dimension of class 
differentiation will require new data and a separate study.  
 
IDENTIFYING CLASS POSITIONS IN RURAL CHINA 
The premise of conducting a study of the outcomes and processes of class 
differentiation in rural China resulting from agrarian change is that capitalism has indeed 
spread in rural China. There is not, however, a consensus on this in the literature. Post (2008, 
324), for example, argues that due to the absence of landed capital – the social-property 
relations that turn land into a commodity and make its accessible only through market 
exchange are still missing – and the continued dominance of non-capitalist forms of social 
labour in agriculture, ‘the Chinese countryside remains decidedly non-capitalist’, and, ‘not 
surprisingly, there is little social differentiation of the rural producers.’ Huang et al.’s (2012) 
finding that hired year-worker constitutes only three per cent of total labour input in Chinese 
agriculture may also suggest the absence of capitalism. Thus, before delving into empirical 
analysis, which I hope will make clear that such a view is no longer tenable, it is necessary to 
first quickly sketch out here how much capitalism has spread in Chinese agriculture.  
                                                
2 For an example of the varying definitions of households in a context of widespread polygyny, see Oya (2004).  
3 In rural China, male and agnatic members are favored in controlling household property and surplus. For 
empirical studies on this, see Sargeson and Song (2010) and Jacka (2012). 
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An important starting point here is that, in agrarian transition, proletarianized ‘free’ 
wage labour is not the only way through which labour can be exploited by capital, and thus, 
wage employment in labour-hiring capitalist farming is not the only way that capitalism can 
spread in agriculture (Bernstein 2010). As mentioned earlier, the spread of commodity 
relations and market imperatives are the processes through which capitalism grows, which 
may involve development of wage labour, but can also proceed through a transformation of 
family-based farming. In China, agrarian capitalism grows mainly through this latter path.  
In another study, Huang and Gao (2013) find that ‘family farms’ have greatly 
increased their levels of capitalization – through investments in both fixed asset and modern 
inputs – in the past 15 years, on a scale that equals the investments made by the state and far 
surpasses that by capitalist firms. Although Huang and Gao do not interpret it this way, their 
argument suggests that commercialized family farms in rural China are integrated in 
commodity relations and driven by capitalist markets, and have to increase capitalization in 
order to keep up with rising levels of labour productivity. Analysis in later parts of this paper 
will show the diverse ways through which ‘family farms’ have been transformed into 
capitalist producers – mainly through adopting the logic of accumulation and 
commodification rather than hiring wage labour. 
Another key change that counters Post’s (2008) assessment is the rapid 
commodification of land in recent years. First, the passage of the Property Rights Law in 
2007 and the second-round land contracting based on 30-year tenure both make rural land 
rights now more private and permanent. Then, aided by the rapid development of rental 
markets for farmland, construction land and other rural land, land has become increasingly 
commodified and accessible though market exchanges. This is the key change that paves the 
way for the entry of labour-hiring agribusiness companies, which obtain land through 
commodity relations that may be intermediated by local states. Later analysis will show that 
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even for family farmers, their entitlement to farmland based on village membership is turning 
into a market-mediated access, which they would part with when their expected combined 
returns on land-rental market and wage income exceed that from family farming. In summary, 
the conditions for studying class differentiation in a Chinese countryside that is ‘decidedly 
capitalist’ – to reverse Post (2008) – are ripe.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the outcomes and dynamics of class 
differentiation in agrarian change, not to map out the comprehensive class structure in rural 
China and examine all its class relations. The study’s focus is on class positions in the 
agrarian economy, not rural class structure more generally, and therefore excludes non-
agrarian classes, such as the professionals4, industrial and commercial employers, and non-
agrarian petty bourgeoisie. Another actor that plays a crucial role in rural class formation is 
state cadres. For village-level ‘cadres’5, their political office-holding in itself, I argue, is no 
longer a basis for an elite class position. Political office-holding at the village level is part-
time and lowly paid – monthly salaries are in the range of several hundreds of yuan, which is 
the worth of a few days’ work as an odd labour in many places. Village cadres typically are 
still among the local elite. That, however, is not the result of their office-holding; it is rather 
                                                
4 The number of people in professional and managerial occupations (either as employees or self-employed) is 
growing in rural China, but remains small. This group comprises managerial and skilled employees in both rural 
firms and social agencies such as schools, clinics, and cultural stations, and self-employed professionals, such as 
medical practitioners running private clinics. This group’s higher level of education distinguishes them from the 
rest of the rural population. This sometimes puts them in a pivotal position to mediate the rural population’s 
interactions with outside forces and represent or mobilize the rural population in collective actions. 
5 Strictly speaking, village-level cadres, including members of the Villagers’ Committee, who are elected by 
villagers, and the Party branch secretary and members are not state-employed cadres in the official 
administrative hierarchy. They are still commonly considered and referred to as ‘cadres’ (ganbu) by villagers 
and often act as agents of the state.  
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that their economic success leads to office-holding. A detailed discussion will follow; it 
suffices to say here that their class positions will be identified like others on the basis of their 
market situations, which are often shaped by their office-holding but not reducible to it. 
Township-level cadres are in a different position. Their income from fulltime state 
employment, job security, privileged access to social benefits, and political power, which 
gives them control over much greater public resources than grassroots officeholders, all give 
them a secure position in the local elite. They are not, however, an agrarian class. They 
typically live and work in urbanized small towns (or commute from the county seat), hold 
urban household registration, and are increasingly recruited from college graduates (Ouyang 
2011a). As agents of the state, they play important roles in rural class formation, and can be 
connected to the rural population, especially the local capitalist class, by the ‘thousand 
threads’ – family ties and clientelist ties, for example. While the role of the local state in 
agrarian change and class formation is a key theme in this study, a serious analysis of the 
class nature of the township-level state is beyond its scope. 
Using the analytical approach proposed earlier, I identify five agrarian classes based 
on rural households’ combinations of positions in four markets, as summarized in Table 1.6 
Although mathematically, more combinations of market situations are possible, these five 
class positions are both empirically regularly observed and theoretically meaningful – they fit 
the widely used five-class framework that originated from Lenin’s classical work (minus the 
landlord class). Similar to many of the studies reviewed earlier, I also exclude the credit 
market, due to both lack of data and the under-developed rural finance system in China.7  
[INSERT TALBE 1 HERE.] 
                                                
6 The labels ‘employers’, ‘farmers’, ‘workers’ and ‘peasants’ are shorthand for ‘employer households’ and so on. 
7 I suspect that the addition of credit market into the framework, which is an urgent step future studies should 
take, will likely lead to intra-class differentiation rather than creating new class positions. 
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In the following empirical analysis of the characteristic market situations of each class 
and the dynamics that drive their differentiation, I focus on four central themes: the dynamics 
of accumulation, commodification of subsistence, role of the state, and contradictory 
tendencies of emerging structural stability and a state of flux in these class positions.  
Empirical evidence for this analysis is drawn from both secondary literature and my 
own fieldwork observations over the past eight years across rural China. Aggregate-level 
statistical data, such as the national agricultural census, statistical yearbooks, and other 
national or sub-national surveys have proven of little use for this type of analysis. These data 
are either not collected or released at the household level, such as statistical yearbooks and 
agricultural census, or, when they are, their instruments are not fitted for collecting 
information on, for example, the highly fluid and informal activities in rural labour and land 
markets.8 Village case studies, another widely used method, are also problematic for this 
study. Dynamics of agrarian change and the resulting class differentiation tend to follow 
distinctive local paths, determined by the local political economy (Zhang 2013). Certain class 
positions, because of either their competitive relations in markets or the very different 
political-economic conditions that their existence depends on, often do not co-exist in the 
same village – for example, corporate farms and petty commodity producers. Thus, village 
case studies are not useful for either identifying heterogeneous class positions or discovering 
the diverse dynamics that drive differentiation, which can vary widely across localities.  
The goals selected for this study and the limited data that are now available mean that 
what is presented in the following is a sketchy outline of the contours of class differentiation 
emerging in rural China and a summary account of key dynamics driving class differentiation. 
An elaborate analysis of all the dynamics for each class, a full empirical substantiation, or a 
                                                
8 For a thorough discussion on how conventional survey data are poorly fitted for the task of measuring rural 
wage employment in developing countries, including China, see Oya and Pontara (2015).  
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quantitative estimate of the size of each class will all have to wait for future research. Finally, 
the ‘subsistence peasant’ class is identified here as a residual category. Households can be 
locked in such a position due to either labour disadvantages – lack of labour suitable for 
either wage work or agricultural commodity production – or severe underdevelopment of 
local markets, as is the case in remote, ethnic minority areas. This category will not be 
subjected to empirical analysis here. 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FARMERS: THE CAPITALIST CLASS AND DYANMICS OF 
ACCUMULATION 
In the capitalist employer class, I include both the entrepreneurial farmers who have 
expanded to a scale that requires year-round labour hiring and top managers in agribusiness-
founded, labour-hiring corporate farms, who, even though they may not be owners of the 
companies, act as ‘representatives of capitalist relations of production’ (Byres 2003).9 Both 
types of production are fully based on commodity relations, including hiring wage labour and 
leasing in land, and driven by the capitalist imperative of accumulation through expanded 
reproduction – appropriating labour surplus, re-investing profit in developing the productive 
forces, and expanding the scale of production.  
Most arable land in rural China is collectively owned and has been contracted to rural 
households in small parcels. For farming operation to rise to a scale that warrants year-round 
labour hiring, it almost always requires acquisition of additional land. In most cases, this is 
done through rental arrangements with either individual households, village collectives, or, in 
                                                
9 For these two groups, I only look at the household member, usually male, who occupies the employer position, 
and assume that other household members, even if they do not share the property control and production 
relations, at least share similar life chances determined by the primary member’s income. Among the five 
classes I identify, this is the only case where I only consider one household member’s economic activities. 
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rare cases where the land is state-owned, as in state farms, some state agencies. The 
development of land-rental markets is therefore a crucial condition for the rise of this class.10 
The growth of capitalist employers is also strongly fuelled by state policies that 
favour large-scale and capitalized producers. Such policy support from the central level, 
which started in the late 1990s, initially targeted the so-called ‘dragon-head companies’ and 
provided financial incentives to spur their entry into scaled-up agricultural production (Huang 
2011; Zhang and Donaldson 2008). In the mid-2000s, especially after the Farmers’ 
Specialized Cooperatives Law was passed in 2006, the central government also started to 
expand its financial support to farmers’ cooperatives as another vehicle of scaling up and 
modernizing agriculture. In practice, however, most studies find that agribusiness companies 
and entrepreneurial farmers have captured the bulk of state subsidies intended for cooperative 
– simply by re-branding themselves as ‘cooperatives’ – while authentic cooperatives formed 
by smaller producers are few and far between (Tong and Wen 2009; Yan and Chen 2013).  
The central government’s most recent favoured target for receiving financial support 
is so-called ‘family farms’ (jiating nongchang), which was identified in the No.1 Central 
Policy Document of 2013, together with dragon-head companies and farmers’ cooperatives, 
as the third vehicle for promoting scaled-up agriculture. The ‘family farms’ favoured by 
central government are not scale-neutral. A Ministry of Agriculture survey in 2012 of 
877,000 ‘family farms’ nation-wide finds that the average size of these farms is 200 mu, 27 
times the average size of rural households’ allocated land, and on average each hires 1.68 
non-family year-workers (Gao et al. 2014). This survey also provides an indication of the 
economic prowess of this class of entrepreneurial farmers: the land they cultivate constitutes 
                                                
10 There is a large literature on the development of land-rental markets in rural China and its institution building 
process. See, for example, Ho and Lin (2003), Po (2008), and Zhang et al. (2004).  
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13.4 percent of all contracted farmland in the country.11 Clearly, these ‘family farms’ are 
really entrepreneurial farms. They are ‘family’ farms in the sense of being family-owned or 
family-managed. They should be differentiated from what is commonly understood as 
smallholding, family-worked farms,12 which are also a heterogeneous group, as discussed in 
the following two sections. 
What distinguishes this class from the rest is of course their successful accumulation 
of capital, which enables them to lease in land, hire wage labour and invest in capitalization, 
but also compels them to reproduce on an expanded scale. For the corporate farms, their 
initial capital can come from a variety of sources, including local township-and-village 
enterprises (TVEs), urban state-owned firms (state-owned giants like SinoChem, COFCO and 
China Resources all have extensive investments and operations in agriculture), domestic 
private firms, and foreign firms. These forms of large corporate capital will not be further 
discussed here. I focus instead on smaller-scale private capital and divide them, by their 
different processes of entry and dynamics of accumulation, into two types: politically-assisted 
accumulation and accumulation from below.  
 
Politically-assisted Accumulation 
From the start of rural industrialization in the early 1980s, political power has played 
an important role in assisting the embourgeoisiement of rural China’s entrepreneurial class. 
The social origin of rural China’s first wave of entrepreneurs, who started small businesses in 
                                                
11 This is definitely an underestimation, as many entrepreneurial farms do not meet the official criteria – which 
vary across localities – of ‘family farms’ and are excluded from the survey. These 877,000 entrepreneurial farms, 
assuming they are each managed by a single family, translate into merely 0.33 per cent of the total number of 
households in rural China. This estimate, however, is also a severe underestimation, as the total number of 
households, 268 million in 2012, is based on rural household registration and many are no longer in farming.  
12 These three terms of ‘family farm’ come from Bernstein (2010, 93). 
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the early 1980s, was once a topic of intense debate. But by the late 1990s, a consensus started 
to appear: cadres were adaptive to changes in the local economic structure. By taking 
advantage of their positional resources, rural cadres’ families managed to maintain a 
consistent advantage in incomes across diverse local economic contexts through benefiting 
more from the most lucrative opportunities in the local economy, be it wage employment in 
inland regions or private entrepreneurship in coastal regions (Parish and Michelson 1996; 
Walder 2002).  
Against this background, we have reasons to expect that political office-holding will 
continue to play a key role in assisting accumulation in capitalist agriculture, and rural cadres 
will have advantages in becoming capitalist farmers. The reality provides support to these 
hypotheses but also adds complexities. I suggest three mechanisms through which the 
dynamics of using political power and capitalizing on collective resources to assist capitalist 
accumulation in agriculture work.  
 
Office-holding by invitation   By the end of the 1990s, the first generation of rural 
cadres had largely successfully accomplished either the embourgeoisiement (via private 
entrepreneurship) or de-agrarianization (via wage employment) of their families (Walder and 
Zhao 2006). What then followed was a period of intense tension between the rural population 
and local state, centred around the issue of excessive ‘peasant burdens’ (Bernstein and Lu 
2000). The predation by local governments severely worsened cadre-mass relationship and 
made grassroots office-holding a highly difficult task and a job widely despised by people. 
For cadres who already managed to enter the new economic elite, it made little sense to 
continue office-holding, which was not only time-consuming but also exposed them to 
unnecessary risks – in cases where the tension erupted in riots, local cadres were routinely 
beaten and their properties damaged by protesting peasants (Bernstein and Lu 2000). What 
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ensued then was a bifurcation of the grassroots economic elite and officeholders, who had in 
early years often been the same.  
On the eve of the rural tax reform that started in 2004, in many places the local 
economic elite had made a clear break with grassroots office-holding. Many rural areas had 
difficulties finding capable people to hold political offices; in some cases, cadre positions 
were ‘gangsterized’ and controlled by criminal elements (Xiao 2006). It is in this context of a 
debilitating deficit of grassroots leadership and all the problems in rural governance it created 
that a new trend was started by local governments in the more developed regions: recruiting 
private entrepreneurs into political office-holding at the village level through either 
appointing them as village party secretaries or nominating and supporting them in elections 
for village committee chairs. This began to reverse the bifurcation between the economic elite 
and political office-holding and set a model that was later adopted across the country. This 
program is now widely known as “village leadership to the rich” (furen zhicun) (He 2011a; 
Ouyang 2011b; Yan 2012).  
The economic elite responded favourably to this initiative, especially in the more 
developed coastal provinces that have more entrepreneurs. In Zhejiang, where the “leadership 
to the rich” movement has made the most progress, a survey by the provincial Bureau of 
Civil Affairs finds that, by 2009, two thirds of villages in the province have members of the 
new entrepreneurial elite serving as either the village committee chair or party secretary 
(Ouyang 2011b). Another study in a county in Hebei finds that 35.5 per cent of the village 
party secretaries appointed between 1998 and 2004 came from the new economic elite (Yan 
2012, 340). 
‘Office-holding by invitation’ provides entrepreneurs three types of benefits. First, the 
collective resources that village leaders now control are mainly natural resources, such as 
land, minerals, water, and forests, which can be mobilized by entrepreneurs’ financial capital 
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and other social and political resources into the circuit of capital. For example, in the three 
villages that He (2011) studied in Fenghua, Zhejiang, the rich entrepreneurs recruited by the 
township government to become party secretaries all used their personal funds to engage in 
real estate development in the hope of raising land values. Second, acting both as village 
representatives in interacting with upper-level governments and agents helping upper-level 
governments implementing policies, village leaders are in more advantageous positions to 
benefit from state subsidies and other forms of fiscal transfer. Many subsidies, as mentioned 
above, are not scale or resource neutral. They are more meaningful to the economic elite, who, 
once becoming village leaders, can select their own businesses to receive these subsidies 
(Ouyang 2011b). Last, village leaders also get opportunities to cultivate personal 
relationships with government officials and pave their way into the local People’s Congress 
or Political Consultative Conference, which provide them the political protection that can be 
crucial to their wealth and security (Yan 2012). 
Office-holding by invitation has therefore initiated and facilitated the entry of private 
capital, which can be initially accumulated from either agricultural or non-agricultural 
ventures13, into agriculture. While I do not rule out the possibility of noble motives such as 
paying back to one’s home village, the key motivation for entrepreneurs in taking grassroots 
offices is the opportunity to mobilize undervalued collective resources into the circuit of 
capital – this is also what both villagers and local governments often want, as it creates wage 
jobs and tax revenues. In practice, this often means capitalizing on land through real estate 
development or scaled-up commodity farming. These entrepreneurs-turned-village leaders 
then become the new capitalist farmers – or, if they were already, now on larger scales.  
                                                
13 In Ouyang’s (2011b) sample of 22 village leaders from one township in an inland province, four operate live-
stock farms, only three are ordinary farmers, while the rest run non-farm businesses.  
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Ouyang’s (2011b) example of the owner of a pig farm illustrates this process. After 
becoming the village party secretary, his pig farm was prioritized by the township 
government in receiving subsidies for purchasing sows and feeds, selected as the township’s 
‘star enterprise’, and included in the cooperative that the township had formed to benefit from 
all the subsidies there. His farm also expanded three times bigger by taking collective land.  
We should note that both the backgrounds of these ‘invited’ cadres and their 
economic pursuits after taking office are diverse. Some, like the case above, were already 
entrepreneurial farmers, but expanded their accumulation with the help of office-holding; 
others were industrial entrepreneurs who then engaged in real estate development or 
industrial production (which can be a small hydro-electrical power station, a lumber mill, a 
cement factory, and so on). What is important for our analysis is that ‘office-holding by 
invitation’ opens a door that channels private capital into capitalist farming; and once the 
operation starts, its accumulation is helped by advantages that come with office-holding.  
Another importance of this development is to rural differentiation. Now that recruiting 
members from the economic elite into grassroots leadership positions has become a key 
principle in local Party-building efforts, and personal economic success is almost an 
eligibility requirement for village-level office-holding (Ouyang 2011b; Yan 2012), the 
bifurcation of the elite between political officeholders and entrepreneurs that once existed in 
the late 1990s is rapidly coming to an end. In many rural areas, the grassroots-level state 
cadres are no longer a separate class, but practically one and the same with the local capitalist 
class – be it agricultural or non-agricultural.  
 
Cashing in on political connections   Office-holding by invitation is just a specific 
type of a more general form. Without involving office-holding, political power can also be 
mobilized through various types of social ties to assist accumulation in capitalist farming 
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through either taking control of collective resources or gaining access to political privileges 
such as public funds. In doing so, without requiring previously accumulated capital, political 
power can seemingly ‘create’ capital accumulation out of thin air by, to use the parlance of 
mainstream economists in today’s China, ‘turning assets into capital’.  
The most important ‘assets’ in rural China are of course collectively owned land-
based resources, which are rapidly being turned into capital by local governments in a frenzy 
of ‘courting businesses and attracting investment’ (zhaoshang yinzi). The fiscal conditions 
and bureaucratic institutions that create local governments’ (county and township levels) 
heavy dependence on business investments from outside are well studied and will not be 
elaborated here.14 What this has created is an environment in which, when someone came 
with just an alleged intention to invest or a perceived possible capability to invest even 
without any clear intention, the local government will cajole, persuade, and help them to 
make the investment happen.15 To sweeten the deals, local governments routinely grant 
potential investors tax breaks, privileged access to bank loans and government subsidies, and 
discounted access to collective resources.  
In Guo’s (2011) study of how collectively owned forestland is turned into capital 
accumulation in a township in Hubei province, a new private company was formed by two 
businessmen in the nearby city as a vehicle to ‘invest’ in capitalist agriculture. The company 
claimed that it would invest 100 million yuan – which just happened to be the annual quota of 
investment that the township needed to fulfil – to build an agricultural park (for the 
production of livestock, fruits, and landscape trees). The company’s registered capital, 
                                                
14 See, for example, Kennedy (2007), Ouyang (2011a), and Smith (2010).  
15 Local officials have direct financial stakes in such investments, as they either gain a commission from realized 
investment or forfeit their deposit with the government if they fail to meet a certain target (Guo 2011; Ouyang 
2011a). 
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however, was only five million yuan (even how much of that was really theirs is 
questionable). But their alleged intention and perceived ability to invest was enough to get 
the attention of both the township and county governments and their determined support. 
With the newly cultivated political connections and a lot of arm-twisting by local thugs they 
hired, in the span of just one year, the company managed to obtain from individual 
households 20-year leases on thousands of mu of forestland at low prices. It was these newly 
acquired use rights of forestland that then became the company’s real capital. It then 
leveraged these land rights as collaterals to obtain bank loans and to apply for government 
subsidies earmarked under the province’s ‘Sloping land development’ project. Only after the 
infusion of capital from bank loans and government subsidies, was the company then able to 
start hiring labour, buying means of production, and operating the agricultural park.  
The five million yuan the company started with would never have become capital, had 
the company not been able to leverage its political connections to obtain land rights with that 
money. Once the money took the form of land rights, political power again was mobilized to 
get additional capital infusion from bank loans and state subsidies, which then kick-started 
the circuit of accumulation through expanded reproduction.  
Many similar cases have been observed elsewhere (Ouyang 2011a). For all these 
cases, accumulation from capitalist farming could only start after collective resources, 
typically land-based, or public funds in the form of governments’ scale-based agriculture 
subsidies – but typically both – are turned into capital; and extra-economic power is the 
catalyst that makes the process of commodification and capitalization roll. In this sense, this 
process resembles what David Harvey (2003) describes as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. 
 
Turning cadres into entrepreneurs  In the two previous cases, political power assists 
outside entrepreneurs to gain access to either collectively owned resources or public funds 
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and use these in accumulation. This political power and logic of accumulation can also be 
harnessed by incumbent grassroots cadres indigenous to villages, and this is a widely 
observed pattern across rural China. In my own fieldwork, I have seen cases in Anning 
county, Yunnan, where a village chief’s son-in-law leased hundreds of mu of sloping land in 
that village, which had previously been classified as wasteland, to build a labour-hiring 
commercial orchard; in Pinghe county, Fujian, where the village party secretary and other 
cadre families contracted all the village’s forestland to grow eucalyptus trees to supply to a 
paper mill; and in some state farms in Heilongjiang, where cadres used the state farms’ 
resources to drain wetland and developed it into large-scale mechanized rice farms.  
In all these cases, the land involved is not farmland, which would be allocated to 
village households under greater egalitarian constraints. It is with these un-allocated, publicly 
owned ‘wastelands’ – forestland, wetland, grassland and sloping land – that cadres have more 
privileged access and greater flexibility of disposal. Other rural households are excluded from 
this because families of village cadres and their relatives had both the foresight and the 
capital to contract from villages or rent from other households all ‘wastelands’. Chen’s (2012) 
study of navel orange production in a county in southern Jiangxi reveals the same pattern of 
differentiation among farming households, whose access to forestland varies greatly. Some, 
deterred by the high risks in this new market or high entry costs, rented out all their forestland 
and chose to pursue wage work; others – mostly cadre families under the prodding of the 
county government, which spearheaded the introduction of this new crop – rented in 
forestland and became labour-hiring capitalist farmers.  
Although there are certainly cadres who simply abused their political power and took 
over collective resources in a primitive-accumulation fashion, what is described above seems 
to be a more general phenomenon and has a different implication. It shows that with the 
positional advantages they legitimately gain from office-holding – both their power as the 
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caretakers and managers of collective resources and their access and sensitivity to policy 
information and market trends – cadres can achieve accumulation based on privileged control 
over public resources without abusing official power, or, put differently, without resorting to 
extra-economic means. In such cases, the transformation of public resources into private 
capital does not go through the contentious ‘primitive accumulation’ Marx described, but 
proceeds in a more ‘voluntaristic’, market-based type of commodification.  
 
Accumulation from Below 
In rural China, one’s ability to lease in land on the land market is a crucial pre-
condition for expanding to the scale of a labour-hiring entrepreneurial farmer. On a 
rationalized land market with arm’s-length transactions, money is virtually all one needs to be 
in that position. But land rental markets in rural China often remain deeply embedded in local, 
particularistic social ties, and are thus not easily accessible to outsiders.16 Studies find that, on 
one hand, human capital variables only explain a small portion of the variance in the amount 
of leased-in land (Zhang et al. 2004); on the other, most land rental transactions occur within 
small ‘villager groups’ and among relatives, friends, and kin members, and are typically 
informal, rarely involving contracts (Yang 2012; Zang 2012). In this sense, these land rentals 
are only ‘market-like’ or quasi-market.   
This suggests a unique set of dynamics that lead to differentiation in land-rental 
market: the possibility of capitalist land leasing is only accessible on the basis of certain 
social characteristics, such as extensive and strong social ties and high social standing in the 
community. The presence of these social barriers to land leasing, which is particularly 
relevant in the early stages of China’s agrarian transition, creates a pattern of differentiation 
                                                
16 This is also why outside companies like the earlier example in Hubei need to mobilize political connections 
with local cadres to help leasing in land.  
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in which expanded-scale entrepreneurial farming was only a viable strategy for a small group 
of households in any given village.17  
Another important condition for a household to operate a scaled-up, labour-hiring 
farm is the possession of an exclusive productivity premium.18 This premium can be based on 
either superior technical conditions of production (made possible by a higher level of 
capitalization, which of course requires greater capital endowment) or superior skills. It is 
only on the basis of such a productivity premium that the entrepreneurial farmer can then 
either produce a crop with higher returns while others cannot, or produce the same crop more 
productively so that they can afford to pay competitive rents. Otherwise, without such a 
differentiation in productivity, there would not be sufficient differentiation across households 
in their resource allocation decisions that gives rise to wage labour for hire and, more 
crucially, land for rent.  
Two examples help to illustrate this. When I visited his village in Yunnan province’s 
Chenggong county in 2007, Mr. Hong leased in nearly 20 mu of farmland from households in 
neighbouring villages and regularly hired seven to ten wage workers in his profitable 
production of high-value vegetables. In his early 50s, he had farmed for his entire adult life 
and initially learned how to grow vegetables as a temporary hired hand at another’s farm. 
Over the years, he had gained enough know-how and experience that enabled him – and a 
few other households in his village – to venture into growing more skill-intensive and high-
value varieties such as Italian lettuce. Mr. Hong and other entrepreneurial farmers in his 
village enjoyed a skill premium that prevented others in the surrounding areas from entering 
this market segment. In fact, those households were willing to rent out their land to Mr. Hong 
                                                
17 The presence of social barriers also means that land rental arrangements were relatively stable despite the 
infrequent use of long-term leases, because there were few competitors. 
18 This is probably a sufficient but not a necessary condition.  
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on five-year leases and work as wage labourers so that they could learn the skills and start 
growing vegetables – at least cheaper varieties such as cabbage – on their own later.  
Mr. Jia is one of the largest rice farmers in Sichuan province. When I visited him in 
2014, his scale has expanded to over 3000 mu of irrigated rice paddies in an area where the 
average household farm is below three mu. His operation is highly mechanized; he has 
invested over one million yuan in machinery and built a 1,000m2 centralized facility for 
incubation and storage. He hires about 20 workers year-round and over 200 during peak 
seasons. He claims that what make his mechanized rice farm successful while those run by 
outside capital have failed are the skills he has accumulated from nearly 30 years of farming 
experience. By knowing the optimal timing and amount of fertilizer and pesticide application, 
he can achieve higher yields at significantly lower costs than his competitors – who are other 
large-scale, capitalized producers.19 It is this skill premium and the resulting market 
advantage that has allowed him to outperform his competitors and scale up rapidly.  
This productivity-based route of ‘accumulation from below’ represents a conceptually 
distinct dynamic of accumulation. In empirical analysis, however, this may not always be 
separable from politically assisted accumulation. Since both the social capital and 
productivity premium that are essential for accumulation from below are also the 
characteristics required for office-holding (Xiao 2006), the two dynamics of accumulation 
can lead to the same differentiation outcome: the class of ‘indigenous’ capitalist farmers in 
any given village is probably dominated by cadre households and their relatives.20 A possible 
method to identify a cadre-entrepreneur’s path of accumulation in empirical analysis is by 
                                                
19 This area has a thriving liquor-manufacturing industry that offers abundant wage jobs. Rural households have 
largely abandoned small-scale rice farming using family labour, a development discussed later.  
20 Mr. Hong, the vegetable farmer, was a former village Party secretary; Mr. Jia never had office-holding 
experience.  
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looking at the type of land acquisition. If the newly acquired land is farmland initially 
allocated to households, to which cadres’ positional power does not give them privileged 
access, then that is more likely to be acquired by using social capital and productivity 
premium.  
The relationship between these two paths of accumulation is dynamic. Two recent 
developments, both involving the strong hand of the state, are undermining the viability of 
‘accumulation from below’. First, as local states build new regional platforms to speed up 
land-rental transfers,21 the local social barriers that once favoured indigenous entrepreneurial 
farmers are being cleared. On the larger-scale and more disembedded market, indigenous 
entrepreneurs are in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis outside capital, which is both bigger 
and more able to mobilize higher-level political power. Second, the scale-biased agricultural 
subsidies provided by both central and local governments are undermining indigenous 
entrepreneurs’ productivity premium. By qualifying for greater subsidies, bigger-scale 
capitalist farms, which include both corporate-invested farms and those formed through 
politically assisted accumulation, can neutralize or even reverse the productivity premium 
that indigenous entrepreneurs once enjoyed.  
 
COMMERCIAL FARMERS: THE AGRARIAN PETTY BOURGEOISIE AND 
TENDENCIES OF DIFFERENTIATION 
The key difference of commercial farmers from capitalist employers is that they rely 
on their own labour and family-owned means of production to operate ‘family-worked’ farms. 
At the same time, their full market integration and market dependence separates them from 
                                                
21 Many municipalities, including Chengdu, Wuhan, Chongqing and Tianjin, have established ‘integrated rural 
property rights exchanges’, where households can list their contracted land to be leased to any bidder. The exact 
mechanisms and impacts of these new institutional platforms are a topic that urgently needs investigation.  
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the traditional subsistence peasants.22 The term ‘petty commodity producer’ summarizes both 
their family-based small scale and their integration in commodity relations.23  
Commercial farmers in China, especially those in ‘new agriculture’, can rely entirely 
on their allocated household land without participating in land-rental markets; but those in 
old agriculture typically need to lease in land, as in most areas allocated household land is too 
small to provide full employment to the family in low-value and low-labour intensity old 
agriculture.24 But even without engaging in actual rental activities, the fact that land rights 
have become a commodity means that their relationship with allocated household land has 
been commodified. Initial access to farmland was still granted as an entitlement of village 
membership; but now that the state has made land reallocations by collective authorities 
illegal, rural households’ relationship with their allocated land during their 30-year lease 
tenure has been turned into an economic relationship: they can part with it or expand it 
through economic means and only economic means.25 Their social reproduction as 
                                                
22 For a conceptual discussion on the difference between petty/simple commodity producers and peasants in the 
Chinese context, see Zhang and Donaldson (2010).  
23 In the Chinese literature, this group has been referred to as the ‘middle farmers/peasants’ (He 2011b; Yang 
2012). I eschew this term for two reasons. First, it may unnecessarily invoke the political connotations 
associated with it by the Chinese Communist Party’s class labelling during the revolution and socialist periods. 
Second, ‘middle’ is a vague term that is primarily identified on scale – a problematic instrument for classifying 
rural producers. It masks possible differentiation among producers farming on a similar scale of landholding.   
24 I borrow the terms from Huang and Gao (2013). ‘New agriculture’ refers to that of higher-value products that 
are both more labour-intensive and capital-intensive, including vegetables, fruits, meats, poultry, fish, eggs and 
milk; whereas ‘old agriculture’ refers to the farming of grains, oil crops and cotton.  
25 Land reallocations by the collective authority, in contrast, were made often for non-economic reasons such as 
demographic changes and egalitarian concerns. In practice, some villages still periodically reallocate land across 
households for egalitarian purposes, defying the central decree (Kong and Unger 2013). Land expropriation by 
the state is another non-economic change. 
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commercial farmers – namely, the reproduction of the conditions of commercial production, 
including their hold on allocated household land – has now become market-dependent: if they 
are not productive enough in commodity production, then using household land in family 
farming becomes a suboptimal choice than leasing it out for rent and working for wage 
income. To ensure that their productivity is up to the market standard, they are also 
compelled to raise the level of capitalization through investing in modern means of 
production and hiring seasonal wage labour – for example, during harvest seasons to meet the 
time constraints imposed by merchants.  
In fact, their success in raising their labour productivity – either through expanding 
farm size or increasing capitalization – is the key that separates this class of petty bourgeoisie 
from the labouring classes discussed later: they have raised their productivity to a level that 
enables full gainful employment of household labour in petty commodity production so that 
they can eschew selling labour for wage income. This raised level of capitalization – realized 
through participation in markets for means of production – is also a key empirical index that 
can be used to identify petty commodity producers: I have seen coffee growers in Pu’er, 
Yunnan, who purchased machines to clean, sort and crush coffee beans, vegetable growers in 
Shandong who spent tens of thousands of yuan to build half-underground weather-controlled 
greenhouses equipped with mechanized curtain pullers, and kiwi growers in Pujiang, Sichuan, 
who invested over 100,00 yuan in cold-storage facility to store their fruits for off-season 
markets.  
 
Contingent Resilience and Tendencies of Differentiation 
Commercial farmers’ market integration can, on one hand, put them in advantageous 
positions to reap the benefits of markets, but, on the other, also expose them to the 
compulsions of market competition, which then creates the tendencies of differentiation 
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among them. In fact, commercial farmer themselves are often the result of a differentiation 
process. The inability to bear heightened market risks or to weather price fluctuations, 
indebtedness created by rising levels of capitalization, changes in family labour supply, 
among other things, can all drive some households out of commercial farming or prevent 
some from entering in the first place. These households then provide the land and labour for 
those who can better meet the market challenges and enjoy the possibility of accumulation.  
These tendencies to differentiation can be moderated or arrested under certain 
conditions. As many have argued, capitalist production only emerges in agriculture when it 
can gain a productivity premium compared to petty production through changing the 
technical conditions of production – by whatever means (Patnaik 1979). The viability of petty 
commodity production can become stable, but this is contingent on the persistence of 
conditions that prevent capitalist production from gaining a premium in productivity.  
In rural China, a typical scenario in which such conditions become present is when a 
low entry cost, in terms of technical, capital and labour requirements in production, allows a 
large number of local households to enter the commercial production of some ‘new 
agriculture’ crops, which then dries up the land supply available for capitalist production. 
This also requires both a relatively equal distribution of initial endowment and some 
conditions, such as the presence of state agencies, that make the technical conditions of 
production stay relatively equal across all producers.  
The much studied case of the thriving commercial vegetable farming in Shouguang 
county of Shandong province is a good example. In the late 1980s, the Party secretary of 
Sanyuanzhu village, Mr. Wang Leyi, developed the technology of temperature-controlled 
greenhouses for year-round vegetable production. The county government then organized 
study trips to Sanyuanzhu village and sent technicians out all over the county to help 
disseminate the technology to farmers free of charge. The county government also built a 
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vegetable wholesale market for local farmers to sell their vegetables. Easy access to market 
and free dissemination of production technology equalized the conditions of production 
across households and lowered the entry cost to the extent that now 80 per cent of family 
farms in the county specialize in commercial vegetable farming, using 300,000 temperature-
controlled greenhouses covering 53,000 hectares of land (Huang 2011).  
The maintenance and reproduction of these conditions is, however, highly difficult. 
They can be undermined by a host of forces, including technological development, state 
intervention, and growing power of capital in upstream and downstream segments; once that 
happens, tendencies to differentiation are unleashed.  
First, as market competition compels commercial farmers to continuously improve 
their productivity, they are put on a treadmill of technological upgrading. When they 
repeatedly adopt modern, industrially produced new inputs, implements and technical 
methods to replace those they previously had control over – a classic case of 
appropriationism (Goodman et al. 1987) – they gradually undermine the conditions of their 
petty bourgeois ‘independence’ by losing control over means of production to the agro- and 
industrial capital that dominates the upstream segments.  
Dong (2012) documents this process in her study of the most recent phase in the 
evolution of Shouguang’s vegetable farming – the country’s most widely known model of 
successful commercial farming. When greenhouse vegetable production first started around 
1990, farmers relied on manual labour to build the greenhouses, each of which took four men 
half a month to build, but cost only 1,000 yuan; they grew the same traditional varieties of 
vegetables inside and outside the greenhouses, and mainly used pig manure as fertilizer, 
which was produced from their own or other villagers’ small backyard pig farms.  
But today, using motorized equipment and hiring professional builders, it takes a few 
days to build a greenhouse, but costs about 80,000 yuan. Such high cost can only be recouped 
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from growing high-value vegetable varieties – those produce higher yields, are both resistant 
to farm chemicals and pests, have the desirable size, shape and colour and high uniformity, 
and are durable enough to sustain long storage and transportation. These all mean one thing: 
patented varieties from foreign agro-technology companies, which have congregated in 
Shouguang as the beachhead to launch their entry into the Chinese market. Some companies 
have also acquired land locally to build seedling farms so that they sell seedlings rather than 
seeds to farmers in order to protect their intellectual properties and reap higher profits. The 
cost of these patented seedlings can be 20 times that of local, publicly available varieties; but 
80 per cent of farmers in the village under study choose the former. Traditional pest-control 
practices that are biologically based but more labour consuming have all been replaced by the 
use of chemical pesticides, some of which are highly toxic and banned by the state but easily 
available on the local black market. The use of pig manure, which requires three days’ work 
by two adults to apply to a 70-meter-long greenhouse, is entirely gone and replaced by 
chemical fertilizer, which takes only three hours to apply in the same greenhouse. Wage rates 
have risen too from 30 yuan per day for an adult man to 200 yuan.  
Dong’s (2012) study also documents two clear impacts of all these changes on the 
once thriving agrarian petty bourgeoisie in Shouguang: increasing differentiation and rising 
challenges of social reproduction. On one hand, the declining profitability of vegetable 
farming has driven some former farmers into the more profitable service works connected 
with vegetable farming, such as transportation, input sales, wholesale distribution, and 
technical services. The remaining farmers, who are in fact stuck in farming by their lack of 
capital or skill, expand their scale and become more reliant on labour-saving technologies. At 
the same time, the younger generation is abandoning farming in pursuit of urban lifestyles, 
even if that means wage work, while the current generation of commercial farmers in their 
40s and 50s face increasing difficulties in reproducing their own labour – their health has 
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paid a heavy price for working under punishing conditions (heavy concentration of chemicals 
in the air, high temperature and humidity) for two decades. 
Huang’s article in this issue provides a vivid account of a similar case. Commercial 
farmers’ pursuit of technical upgrading in shrimp aquaculture brought in exacerbated 
biological risks inherent to these technologies. Eventually, this led to the total collapse of 
household-base petty production, as the required technical conditions of production finally 
surpassed the capability of household producers. Agribusiness then stepped in and hired 
former commercial farmers as wage workers.  
Second, the growing dominance of merchant capital in the output market can have a 
similar squeezing effect of on commercial farmers’ social reproduction. Merchant capital can 
change the terms of exchange to the detriment of commercial farmers (Huang 2012). 
Furthermore, once it becomes oligopolistic, it can also change its relationship with direct 
producers by forming, for example, contract-farming arrangements that reduce farmers’ 
control over both means of production and the production process to the extent that 
commercial farmers become ‘labourers in disguise’.26  
Finally, state interventions can also undermine the viability of the petty bourgeoisie. 
In Shouguang’s case, for example, the equal and easy access to markets that was crucial for 
the initial take-off of petty commodity farming was provided by the local state, which 
‘brought market to farmers’ by building a wholesale market in the county. When the state 
chose different strategies – for example, supporting agribusiness companies through the 
‘company + base + farmers’ model (Zhang 2013) – the outcome was very different. More 
recently, prodded by the central government to further scale up agricultural production, the 
                                                
26 I have elaborated on this thesis elsewhere (Zhang 2012). In this paper, I see contract farming not as a distinct 
class position, but as an institutional arrangement that can take place between agribusinesses and various classes 
of agrarian producers.  
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local state is pushing hard on land transfer and tilting subsidies to bigger producers. The 
detrimental impact on commercial farms is even worse than that on the ‘from-below’ 
capitalist farmers discussed earlier (He 2011b). 
The discussion above raises four issues in our understanding of this class of petty 
bourgeois commercial farmers. First, they are an important empirical reality and constitute a 
sizable population among China’s agriculturalists today. They are of course unevenly 
distributed and tend to have bigger presences in peri-urban areas (Zhang 2013). Second, they 
are subjected to strong tendencies of differentiation as a result of their full integration into 
commodity relations and market dependence. Third, when their position is stable and the 
tendencies of differentiation are arrested, that stability is highly dependent on particular 
political-economic conditions. Thus, they are probably best characterised as having a 
‘contingent resilience’, rather than some essentialised and intrinsic advantages vis-à-vis 
capitalist producers. Fourth, this contingent resilience means that they probably have limited 
chances to play the role of ‘backbone of the rural community’, as some expect (He 2011b; 
Yang 2012). This is not only because they are often in an unstable and transient position 
under constant pressure of differentiation, but also because they occupy an inherently 
‘contradictory class position’ (Wright 1985) and, as result, their class alliances and interest 
articulation will be both shifting and contradictory.  
 
DUAL-EMPLOYMENT HOUSEHOLDS AND WAGE WORKERS: THE CLASSES OF 
LABOUR AND COMMODIFICATION OF SUBSISTENCE 
 
Dual-employment Households 
Dual-employment households combine petty commodity production using family 
labour and land and wage work. The fact that they have to sell labour is an indication of their 
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inability to either expand scale or raise productivity in their petty commodity production to 
provide full employment of family labour on a rate comparable to wage income. Some of 
these households are therefore former petty-bourgeois commercial farmers who have been 
forced to diversify into wage labour by the various forces of differentiation discussed above, 
while others never reached the petty bourgeois position due to high entry costs.27  
The deep penetration of wage work and wage income into rural livelihoods in China 
has been extensively documented (Khan and Riskin 1998; Walder 2002). In official statistics, 
wage income as a proportion of rural per capita income has risen from 19 per cent in 1985 to 
41 per cent in 2010, while income from household-based production (including farming) only 
accounted for 48 per cent in 2010 (NBS 2011). In fact, wage employment spearheaded 
commodification more generally: even before de-collectivization reforms started, hired wage 
labour was already used in agriculture in Guangdong (Chan et al. 1984). Then, the following 
three decades of rural industrialization and massive rural-to-urban migration pulled hundreds 
of millions of rural labourers into wage work. Given the high labour-to-land ratio in rural 
China and low returns to agriculture, rural residents embraced wage jobs when they first 
became available. Thus, the commodification of labour in rural China was mainly driven by 
‘recruitment through market’ (Webber 2008) rather than forceful dispossession.  
The two to three hundred millions of migrant wage workers in cities, however, faced 
various institutional barriers and market disadvantages that have prevented most of them 
from permanently settling in cities. Instead of one-directional migration of full households, 
rural migrants’ wage labour is typically combined with continued family farming through a 
household division of labour with urban wage incomes mainly remitted back to the 
countryside. Huang and Gao (2013, 56) calculate that, in 2011 the total wage incomes of 
                                                
27 Households can also be in this position as a result of members’ lifestyle choices. In a cultural context that 
stigmatizes all things rural, the younger generation can choose an urban lifestyle in spite of lower incomes.  
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migrant workers amounted to 3,072 billion yuan; with another 1,756 billion yuan from 
incomes in rural wage employment, this adds up to a total of nearly 5 trillion yuan of wage 
incomes.  
Huang and Gao (2013, 56) also correctly argue that this 5 trillion yuan of what they 
call ‘blood and sweat capital’ is the main source that funds capitalization – through 
households’ investing wage incomes in capitalizing agricultural petty commodity 
production.28 This wage-income-financed capitalization of family farming, however, has 
further consequences, which Huang and Gao do not elaborate. Rising capitalization becomes 
a key force driving commodification of family farming: it leads to households’ increasing 
participation in markets for means of production and possibly land and labour markets to 
raise productivity, and in product markets to realize returns on these investments. Wide 
participation in wage work stimulates a generalized rise of capitalization in family petty 
commodity production in agriculture; and, as discussed earlier, rising capitalization, while 
improving labour productivity, also leads to increasing competition, market dependence and 
declining real farm gate prices. This then requires households to further divert labour into 
wage work to finance further capitalization and raise the productivity of remaining 
agricultural labour. All households, of course, do not have equal labour endowments, among 
other things. The differentiation of petty commodity producers then ensues. Therefore, the 
capitalization of family-based petty commodity production financed by the blood-and-sweat 
capital does not generally make all family producers more productive and thus more resilient 
in capitalist, market-dependent agriculture, as Huang and Gao (2013) imply, but in fact 
creates differentiation among them.  
                                                
28 We should not assume, however, that wage remittance is all invested in family farming. Instead, wage 
remittance is used to fund social reproduction needs such as housing construction, marriage, healthcare expenses 
and education investment (De Brauw and Rozelle 2008).  
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For the dual-employment households, which all agree are the largest group in rural 
China (He 2011b; Huang and Gao 2013; Yang 2012), this chain of development that started 
with labour commodification has resulted in the full commodification of their subsistence.29 
In the more densely populated eastern half of China, rural residents now see labour as a 
standardised commodity – at least within the scope of a county – that should fetch an 
expected price, regardless of the type of use it is put to.30 In this sense, household members 
who remain in petty commodity farming can be thought of as wage workers ‘hired’ by the 
family: if the returns to their labour time from family farming is inferior to the reference point 
– wage rates in markets for manual labour – then it makes little sense for them to suffer ‘self-
exploitation’ in family farming.31 Their relationship with land, as discussed earlier, has also 
become a commodity relation. For most rural households, but particularly dual-employment 
households, the choice is simply between continued family petty commodity production, or, 
leasing out land for rent and finding wage jobs. In both practices, their subsistence and 
reproduction is based on commodity relations.  
Compared with other classes, the dual-employment households have the most notable 
household division of labour, which typically takes three forms. First, the most prevalent 
                                                
29 The collapse of the socialist rural welfare system, which led to the commodification of healthcare and 
education, also contributed to this.  
30 Gender differences, however, persist. Female labour continues to be devalued. Women are typically paid less 
for the same type of work. Occupational segregation has also emerged. In commercial vegetable farming, for 
example, more technical and higher paid jobs like grafting are dominated by men, while women are relegated to 
grunt work in greenhouses. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  
31 This logic, of course, has its limitations. Not all labour is suited for wage jobs. Some forms of labour, for 
example, that of the physically disabled, the elderly, or even ethnic minorities, can only find gainful 
employment in family farming. This is part of the process through which unequal labour endowments lead to 
differentiation.  
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form is gendered: typically, the husbands migrate to find wage jobs, while wives stay behind 
to farm and provide care for children and the elderly (Jacka 2012; Wu and Ye forthcoming). 
These so-called ‘left-behind women’ often also engage in local wage jobs. They are in fact 
the main source of wage labour for commercial farmers. Second, households that specialize 
mainly in petty commodity farming and employ all members regularly in family farming can 
still engage in seasonal wage jobs.32 Finally, households can adopt a generational division of 
labour, in which unmarried young adult children join wage work, while middle-aged parents, 
who face disadvantages in labour markets, continue with petty commodity farming. In fact, 
such generational divisions of labour – and cross-subsidies between wage work and family 
farming – can also happen between two separate households, those of parents and their non-
coresiding married adult children. Some households we include in the commercial farmer 
category may not in fact be fully independent petty bourgeois but dependent on wage income 
from another household. 
The diverse mechanisms that drive these forms of division of labour within 
households and create differentiation across households are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Status competition among rural households and cultural aspiration for urban lifestyles can 
both play a role in driving labour commodification and migration, even when petty-
commodity farming is possible and even financially more rewarding. But the goal of this 
paper is to analyse the ‘compulsion of dull economic forces’ that is no doubt the primary 
driver of rural class differentiation. It suffices to point out that rural households’ allocation of 
labour across rural-urban and farm-nonfarm divisions – often at great cost to their family 
lives and subjective wellbeing – is not simply a result of them being stopped from full 
                                                
32 This group is then very difficult to be distinguished from petty bourgeois commercial farmers, whose 
withdrawal from selling labour is not absolute either. Their difference is probably more conceptual: commercial 
farmers have more profitable petty commodity production and are thus less compelled to sell labour. 
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urbanization by institutional barriers such as the household registration system. Many 
households choose to invest their ‘blood and sweat capital’ in rural capitalization rather than 
urban integration – such as buying urban housing, which can come with urban household 
registration – because they see the advantages of the former compared to sole dependence on 
urban wage work: lower social reproduction costs, higher returns for the labour endowments 
they have, and the insurance that petty commodity farming provides against the 
precariousness of their wage jobs.  
In this sense, there probably is a further differentiation within this group: some are 
holding on to farming, but have to use wage incomes to finance their capitalization; while 
others are shifting to urban jobs, with farming only the residual of an unfinished transition. 
Among the latter group, while some are prospering in urban jobs, many in fact are 
proletarianized by differentiation among petty commodity producers, as they become too 
poor to farm. They are en route to join wage-worker households.  
 
Wage Workers 
Zhang and Donaldson (2010) identify three types of rural households who are solely 
wage workers. Two are ‘semi-proletarianized’, because they still remain nominal owners of 
their allocated land rights. They both have leased out their land rights and become wage 
workers: one group migrates to more developed areas for agricultural wage work, the other 
stays in their own villages and works for the companies or capitalist farmers who lease in 
their land. A third group are fully proletarianized, landless wage workers, who typically have 
lost their land due to land expropriation. Landless workers’ entry into wage work is easy to 
understand, as they simply have no choice. For ‘semi-proletarianized’ wage workers, the 
distinction between the two types drawn in Zhang and Donaldson (2010) is based on whether 
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they continue to farm in their own villages, rather than the dynamics that drive them into 
wage work, which are more of interest here.  
Without land dispossession, there are three mechanisms that can drive households to 
shift all their labour into wage work. The first, to use Webber’s term ‘recruitment through 
market’ (2008), is when subsistence peasants from poorer areas migrate to more developed 
areas to find wage work in agriculture. Second, farmers can be driven into wage work by land 
transfers, when all their land is leased to corporate farms or capitalist farmers. This is what 
usually happens with ‘politically assisted accumulation’ discussed earlier, in which village 
authorities or local governments consolidate land through encouragement, persuasion and 
intimidation, if necessary, to attract investment by capitalist producers.  
Zhang and Donaldson (2010) provide cases for these two processes. But there is a 
third process in which households are gradually driven out of petty commodity farming by 
differentiation generated by capitalization and market competition. Mrs. Luo, whom I 
interviewed in April 2014, provides a good example. She lives in a village located in one of 
the most productive farming regions of China, the Chengdu plain in Sichuan province. 15 
years ago, she and her husband followed the township government’s instruction and shifted 
from growing rice to fruits. Their commercial farming venture was successful for the first 
few years, but then market saturation drove down prices, and they had to shift from grapes to 
cherries, then to loquats. Her husband first left farming for wage work; then two years ago, 
she gave up too. Now, the husband makes about 4,000 yuan a month as a migrant worker in 
Guangdong, but squanders most of it in gambling. Mrs. Luo has purchased a motorized 
tricycle to ferry tourists around a nearby historic site and earns between two to three thousand 
yuan a month.33 They have a teenage son, who is resolutely not interested in farming and has 
                                                
33 She is technically self-employed, but practically a disguised wage worker.  
44 
 
been in training for different trades, without succeeding in getting a stable job. Their little 
orchard, where loquat trees still grow, is now entirely left to nature.  
Paradoxically, the Luos are both ‘too rich to farm’, because there are higher-paying 
wage jobs available than suffering ‘self-exploitation’ in under-capitalized family farming, 
and ‘too poor to farm’, because they are unable to meet the labour and capital requirements to 
sustain high-risk, high-capitalization petty commodity production. In fact, most households in 
the village are in the same situation, so there is little demand for land rental. Mrs. Luo thinks 
the best thing now can happen to her land is for the state to expropriate it altogether; that way, 
she will at least get a cash pay-out for an otherwise unmarketable asset.  
For the first group of wage workers ‘recruited through market’, who never had a 
chance with petty commodity production, wage work represents upward mobility from 
subsistence farming – at least in income. But for former farmers like the Luos, the shift from 
petty-bourgeois commercial farming to dual employment, and finally to sole dependence on 
wage work is a downward descent, pushed by, first, the commodification of their subsistence 
and then, the capitalist logic of market competition.  
The Luo family’s case and the analysis above highlight the constant flux we find in 
the class differentiation process. While the positions of petty bourgeois commercial farmers, 
dual-employment households and wage-worker households are objective and, as patterned 
combinations of household market situations, relatively stable class positions, the incumbents 
of these positions are in flux. What drive this fluidity in households’ class positions are not 
just the inherent dynamics of differentiation in market-dependent petty commodity 
production, as in the Luo family case, but also external changes in the political economy and 
life cycle dynamics. While I have only examined the movement in one direction, other 
scholars have shown that when an economic downturn causes the decline of wage jobs, as 
happened in 2009, or when the onset of middle age reduces migrant workers’ job-market 
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prospects and raises labour reproduction costs in cities, a movement back from wage work to 
family farming can happen, albeit typically to a depressed level of prosperity (Wen 2013).  
   
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
This study identifies five agrarian class positions in contemporary China. Four of 
these positions have become dependent on commodity relations for their social reproduction 
(or accumulation). These four positions can map onto the four classes Lenin identified in his 
classical study of rural Russia: capitalist ‘rich peasants’, petty bourgeois ‘middle peasants’ 
and ‘small peasants’, semi-proletarian ‘poor peasants’, and proletarian wage labourers. This 
is not surprising, given that once agriculture is integrated into the circuit of capital, it follows 
the same inherent logic of capitalism and generates similar patterns of differentiation.  
Based on the understanding that social relations of production in market-dependent 
capitalist social formations are manifested through market relations, this study uses 
households’ combination of market situations – in labour, land, product and means of 
production markets – as the empirical instrument for identifying class positions. This 
instrument and the classification that it produces should be applicable in other contexts, 
especially where non-farm wage work is widely available and closely bonded with family 
farming.  
This classification is constructed as a heuristic device to help focus our analytical 
gaze on the dynamics of accumulation and commodification that drive the processes of 
differentiation. Those local dynamics and concrete circumstances, which mediate the inherent 
tendency of class differentiation in capitalist agriculture, form the main contents of this 
analysis. With the help of this classificatory scheme, this study offers a summary account of 
the following four key dynamics of agrarian change in rural China and their effects on social 
differentiation: first, the multiple paths of accumulation for capitalist farmers; second, the 
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tendencies of differentiation among petty bourgeois commercial farmers created by the 
market imperatives of competition and capitalization; third, the commodification of 
subsistence that created the labouring classes; and finally, crosscutting the previous three, the 
important and varying roles of the state in either assisting accumulation, providing (or 
undermining) the conditions for viable petty bourgeois commercial farming, and accelerating 
the commodification of labour and land.  
What emerges from this analysis is a different understanding of family farming in 
China that goes beneath the surface of its continued dominance as a form of socially 
organizing labour and land in agricultural production. It reveals its fundamental 
transformation. Family farming in today’s China is no less capitalistic than corporate farming 
organized by agribusiness using wage labour. It heavily depends on wage labour in two ways: 
first, on hired wage workers in agricultural production in family-managed entrepreneurial 
farms and family-worked commercial farms; and second, through capitalization made 
possible by wage income remittance. Furthermore, most family farms have become market-
dependent. Their production and the family producers’ social reproduction can only be 
maintained through market competition and commodity relations. They are subjected to the 
same market imperatives just as corporate farms. They either raise capitalization to increase 
labour and land productivity and stay competitive in markets, or are gradually pushed into 
wage work.  
A clear depiction of class differentiation also provides a backdrop for any study of 
class relations and political processes in rural China. The approach suggested here to do class 
analysis in rural areas starts with identifying class positions and then class actors objectively 
created by these class positions. Understanding class positions and their objective interests 
then informs us about class actors and their relations. A detailed analysis of the emerging 
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class identities and relations is beyond the scope of this paper, but some preliminary 
observations can be derived from the analysis above.  
As a new class structure emerges, we expect that the fault lines in rural society also 
shift. But so far, class-based contention still remains dormant in rural China. The most 
important reason for this is probably the ‘fragmentation of classes of labour’ (Bernstein 2010). 
The majority of rural households now have to pursue their social reproduction across multiple 
sites of the social division of labour simultaneously. While their precarious positions in the 
labour markets are highly similar, their individual experiences in the labouring process and 
relationships with capital and other classes can be highly variable. Many people do enter into 
exploitative relations through wage employment, but such relations are either mediated by 
their households’ simultaneous contradictory positions in petty commodity production or 
spatially displaced due to the migratory nature of most people’s wage employment. Even for 
locally based wage employment, the potential conflicts between classes can still be 
moderated by the dense social relationships that, on one hand, connect employers and 
workers as kin member, for example, while on the other, crosscutting class alliances among 
workers with group identities based on native places or dialects. 
While collective agency among these fragmented classes of labour is difficult, it is not 
impossible, especially when the common foundation of their social reproduction is threatened 
by land grabs, or when fragmentation in wage employment is eliminated in large-scale 
corporate farming, in which an agribusiness rents a village’s land and organizes the entire 
village labour force in wage employment. More rural conflicts are now centred on various 
land-related issues, as access to and control over land-based resources have become the 
centre of contention between competing class interests: capitalist producers want to enclose 
these exclusively in their circuits of capital accumulation, but a broad swathe of the rural 
population that engages in petty commodity production still base their social reproduction on 
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these resources. While market forces can gradually create differentiation and lead to 
increasing concentration of land by capitalist producers, that process can be greatly 
accelerated by mobilizing state power and using extra-economic means. Thus, local states 
often become targets of popular agitation as they act to assist for capitalist accumulation.  
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